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Abstract 
The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is one of 
the most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic.  After the introduction of Extended 
Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock between Norway and Russia.  
Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years.  The purpose of 
this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management of the 
Northeast Atlantic cod fishery.  This will be done in a game theoretic context, based 
on different assumptions regarding important variables such as cost of effort and 
initial stock size.  The game theoretic analysis will be based on an empirical 
bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007, 2010).  The case 
of cooperative management is analysed for different cost parameters and starting 
values of the stock.  An interesting result is that the optimal policy gives rise to pulse 
fishing.  As this involves effort (and harvests) varying from year to year, potentially 
imposing substantial social costs on the industry in years when the fishery is closed, 
a policy of constant effort is also considered.  Finally, non-cooperative management 
is analysed. 
 
 
*The authors would like to thank Røgnvaldur Hannesson and Linda Nøstbakken for 
helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction 
The fishery for Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Barents Sea is 
one of the major and most valuable fisheries in the North Atlantic1.  In some years, 
annual landings have exceeded one million tonnes; since 2004, they have varied 
between 490,000 – 640,000 tonnes.   
After the introduction of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, cod is a shared stock 
between Norway and Russia.  The two countries jointly set the Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC) which is split 50-50, with a given percentage being allocated to third 
countries.  Overfishing of quotas has been a concern for a number of years.   
The purpose of this article is to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative 
management of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery.  This will be done in a game 
theoretic context, based on different assumptions regarding important variables such 
as cost of effort and initial stock size.  The game theoretic analysis will be based on 
an empirical bioeconomic model developed and estimated by Hannesson (2007, 
2010). 
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section gives an overview over 
stock and catch development over time, while the management of the stock is 
reviewed in section 3.  Bioeconomic modelling is undertaken in section 4, while 
alternative management regimes are considered in section 5. The results are 
discussed in the final section.  Background biological data are given in the Appendix. 
 
2. Stock development 
The Northeast Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) has its main spawning grounds 
on the coastal banks of Norway between 62º and 70º N and return to the Barents 
Sea after spawning. Cod, capelin, and herring are considered key fish species in the 
ecosystem and interactions among them generate changes which also affect other 
                                                            
1 An important source on this fishery is given by: International Arctic Science Committee (Content 
Partner); Sidney Draggan (Topic Editor). 2008. "Fisheries and aquaculture in the Northeast Atlantic 
(Barents and Norwegian Seas)." In: Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland (Washington, 
D.C.: Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment). [First 
published in the Encyclopedia of Earth March 29, 2007; Last revised August 29, 2008; Retrieved 
March 9, 2009].  
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Fisheries_and_aquaculture_in_the_Northeast_Atlantic_(Barents_and_
Norwegian_Seas) 
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fish stocks as well as marine mammals and birds (Bogstad et al., 1997). Recruitment 
of cod and herring is enhanced by inflows of Atlantic water carrying large amounts 
of suitable food for larvae and fry of these species. Consequently, survival increases, 
so that juvenile cod and herring become abundant in the area. However, since 
young and juvenile herring prey on capelin larvae in addition to zooplankton, capelin 
recruitment might be negatively affected and thus cause a temporal decline in the 
capelin stock, an occurrence that would affect most species in the area since capelin 
is their main forage fish. Predators would then prey on other small fish and shrimps. 
In particular, cod cannibalism may increase and thus affect future recruitment of cod 
to the fishery (Hamre, 2003).  
Management advice has been provided by the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) from the early 1960s.  A variety of conservation 
measures were recommended in order to increase yield per recruit and to limit the 
overall fishing mortality.  The first TAC for cod was set in 1975, but was far too high. 
Although minimum mesh size regulations had been in force for some years at that 
time, it is fair to conclude that no effective management measures were in operation 
for demersal fish in the area prior to the establishment of the 200 mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) in 1977.  
The Northeast Arctic cod stock has been jointly managed by Norway and 
Russia (earlier the Soviet Union) since 1977, when the 200-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone was established. The primary control instrument is an upper limit on the total 
catch each year, but other controls such as a minimum mesh size and measures 
which aim at increasing the yield of the stock are also in place. The total catch quota 
is shared evenly by Russia and Norway, after setting aside about 15 percent of the 
total for third countries that have traditionally fished this stock. Most of the quotas 
given to each country fishing this stock are allocated between boats from the 
country in question. Norway and Russia monitor the fishing in their respective zones 
and take measures as they deem required against boats breaking the regulations.  
Working Paper No. 26/10 
3 
 
Figure 1 gives annual data2 on spawning stock size, landings and recruitment 
to the spawning stock for the period 1946-2007.  Right after the Second World War, 
the stock was at a high level – almost 4.2 mill tonnes in 1946.  Although there were 
substantial fluctuations over time, the trend in stock size was declining until 1980, 
when it levelled off around 900,000 tonnes for about a decade.  Stock size increased 
in the 1990s to a peak of almost 2.4 mill tonnes in 1993, before falling again.  Stock 
size in 2007 was recorded at 1.7 mill tonnes. 
Landings have fluctuated substantially over time.  In the period 1946-54, 
annual harvest averaged around 800,000 tonnes, increasing to more than 1.3 mill 
tonnes in 1956, the highest level ever recorded.  Landings in excess of 1 million 
tonnes were also achieved in 1968-69 and 1974, however, this level does not appear 
to be sustainable, as landings were reduced below 300,000 tonnes in 1983-84.  
Since 2002, annual landings have varied between 490,000 – 640,000 tonnes. 
Recruitment to the stock is highly variable, varying between a low of 37,000 
tonnes in 1980 and 700,000 tonnes in 1966. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Stock Size, Landings and Recruitment per Year, 1946-2007.  Mill. Tonnes. 
Source:  Appendix, Table A1. 
 
                                                            
2 Spawning stock is defined as yearclasses three and older.  Landings refer to catches of cod from 
yearclasses three and older, while recruitment is to the spawning stock. 
Stock 
Landings 
Recruitment 
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Catches of Northeast Atlantic cod, 1995-2006, by country is given in the 
Appendix (Table A2). Although Norway and Russia take the largest catches, the 
fishery is also significant for fishermen from EU countries, especially Spain and 
United Kingdom. Most of the catch is caught by bottom trawl.  The Norwegian quota 
is caught by vessels using passive fishing gear as well as more active gears such as 
bottom trawl. 
 
3. Management 
A series of agreements has been negotiated among the countries in the 
Northeast Atlantic that establish bilateral and multilateral arrangements for 
cooperation on fisheries management. The most extensive management regime in 
the Northeast Atlantic is that between Norway and Russia. A joint fisheries 
commission meets annually to agree on TACs.  As noted above, the total quotas set 
are shared between the two countries – the allocation key is 50-50 for cod.  A fixed 
additional quantity is awarded to third countries. The EU is given a major share of 
the third country quota of cod in the Norwegian waters north of 62º N as witnessed 
by the catch figures presented in the Appendix, Table A2.  Spanish cod trawlers, 
along with fishing vessels from other EU member countries, fish for cod in the area 
of Svalbard Islands and Norwegian waters north of 62º north. This activity is 
conducted under International Agreements (Paris Treaty, EU-Norway Bilateral 
Agreement), regulating catches as well as conservation measures (TAC system).  
An important aspect of the cooperation with Russia is that a substantial part 
of the Russian harvest in the Barents Sea is taken in the Norwegian zone and landed 
in Norway.  In addition, there is exchange of quotas (Hoel, 1994).  The cooperation 
also entails joint efforts in fisheries research and in enforcement of fisheries 
regulations.  
The cooperation on resource management between Norway and Russia may 
generally be characterised as well functioning (Hønneland, 1993). However, agreed 
TACs by Norway and Russia have, in some years, exceeded those recommended by 
fisheries scientists. In addition, the actual catches have sometimes been larger than 
those agreed. Since the late 1990s, a precautionary approach has been gradually 
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implemented in the management of the most important fisheries. However, 
retrospective analyses have shown that ICES estimates of stock sizes have often 
been too high, thereby incorrectly estimating the effect of a proposed regulatory 
measure on the stock. This has had the unfortunate effect that stock sizes for a 
given year are adjusted downward in subsequent assessments, rendering adopted 
management strategies ineffective (Korsbrekke et al., 2001; Nakken, 1998). 
However, the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission has decided that from 
2004 onwards multi-annual quotas based on a precautionary approach will be 
applied. A new management strategy adopted in 2003 shall ensure that TACs for 
any three-year period shall be in line with the precautionary reference values 
provided by ICES.  
The two main elements of the Norwegian fisheries management system are 
restricting access through licensing schemes and restricting the harvesting through 
quotas (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002).  There are also regulations of minimum mesh 
size, fish size etc. Capacity is restricted through licensing schemes in the trawler 
fleet.  Some segments of the coastal fleet are subject to licensing; others to open 
access. A license is issued to a particular owner and a particular vessel and is not 
transferable.  If a vessel is sold or replaced by a new one, a transfer of fishing 
license must be approved.  Most vessels hold more than one license.  
The quota restrictions are as follows. First, a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is 
fixed, based on advice from ICES (most stocks are shared stocks). Second, the 
Norwegian quotas are then distributed among the main segments of the fishing fleet 
as group quotas. The trawler fleet are allocated Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQs) for 
the Northeast Atlantic cod.  The IVQs vary from year to year and  can be harvested 
freely during the year. Conventional (gear) offshore vessels are allocated IVQs too. 
Maximum quotas, giving maximum catch per vessel, dominate for the coastal fleet. 
The coastal fleet is often what is called “overregulated”.  This means that the sum of 
the vessels’ maximum quotas exceeds the group quota allocated to the coastal 
vessels. 
The total TAC for cod has not always been effectively implemented. Norway 
exceeded its allocated quota for a number of years after the joint Soviet–Norwegian 
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control was put in place, because the agreement permitted Norwegian boats other 
than trawlers to continue fishing even if the Norwegian allocation had been taken. 
This problem has been minor or non-existing since the late 1980s. Unauthorised 
boats, mainly Icelandic, have also at times fished in an area called the Loophole 
outside the Norwegian and Russian EEZs, but this problem has also largely 
disappeared since an agreement with Iceland was reached in 1999.  
 Until recently, Norwegian investigations have indicated that Russia has 
exceeded its quota by perhaps as much as 100,000 tonnes per year, for an unknown 
number of years. The problem appears to be lax control of Russian trawlers fishing 
in the Russian zone. Monitoring catches has been made difficult inter alia by 
transfers of fish at sea (Hannesson, 2007).  The situation may, however, be 
improving.  According to industry sources, there was a substantial reduction in illegal 
landings from 2007 to 2008.  Moreover, national quotas were not exceeded in 20093.  
Whether this improvement in circumstances will continue, remains to be seen. 
 
4. Bioeconomic Modelling 
We will base the analysis on the empirical bioeconomic model developed by 
Hannesson (2007, 2010).  We specify the following harvest function: 
Ht = qEtXt     (1) 
where Ht is harvest, Et is effort and Xt is stock size in year t, while q is the 
catchability coefficient.  Net revenue from the fishery in year t, πt, is given by 
πt = pHt – cEt     (2) 
where p is price and c is the constant unit cost of effort.   
 In bionomic equilibrium (Bjørndal and Munro, 1998), stock size is given by  
X∞ = c/(pq). 
Following Hannesson (2010), parameters are normalised so that p = q = 1, implying 
that 
X∞ = c, 
where c is bionomic equilibrium or the break even stock level.  In other words, it is 
not profitable to reduce the stock below c.  Consequently, 
                                                            
3 See:  http://www.ices.dk/committe/acom/comwork/report/2010/2010/cod-arct.pdf. 
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Ht = EtXt      (2), 
so that Et represents the proportion of the stock harvested.  Accordingly, Et must lie 
between zero and one. 
 Hannesson (2010) provides the following point estimate: 
c = 2,500.  
This means that the stock will never be reduced below 2,500, which corresponds to 
a stock size of 2.5 million tonnes.  
The fact that the cod stock consists of many year classes of fish implies that 
the development of the stock from one year to the next is largely determined by its 
size and the amount of fish caught. Hannesson (2010) considered the following 
specification: 
Xt+1 – Rt+1 = a(Xt - Ht) – b(Xt - Ht)2,    (3) 
where Rt is the recruitment of a new year class of fish in year t, and Ht is the 
landings of fish in year t.   
Hannesson (2010) estimated the model for data for 1946–2005 and obtained 
the following parameter estimates: 
a = 1.558 
b = 0.000145. 
 Hannesson (2010) found only a weak relationship between spawning stock 
size and recruitment.  He did, however, find strong serial correlation in recruitment, 
and estimated the following function: 
Rt = a0 + a1Rt-1 +a2Rt-2 + a3Rt-2  
The following point estimates were obtained:  a0=144.4; a1=0.616; a2=-0.2279; 
a3=-0.0863. 
 This empirical model will be employed in the analysis to follow. 
 
5. Analysis of Alternative Management Regimes  
In this section, we will analyse cooperative and non-cooperative management 
regimes.  This will be done based on different conditions.  We start by specifying 
these. 
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As described above, the Northeast Atlantic cod is shared between Norway and 
Russia, with a small quantity going to third countries.  We will here assume there are 
two players in the fishery, Norway and Russia.  We specify the following initial values  
for X1 and R1, which represent initial stock size and initial recruitment, respectively: 
X1 =  1.7 million tonnes or  
X1  =  3.3 million tonnes. 
R1 = 203.699 million tonnes 
The 2007 stock size is estimated at 1.7 million tonnes (Table A1).  As this is a 
somewhat low level, we will see what difference, if any, it would be to start out at a 
higher stock level, which is here set at 3.3 million tonnes.  R1 is set at the 2007 
value, the most recent estimate available (Appendix, Table A1).   
Under natural conditions, i.e., with no fishing, stock size will approach the 
carrying capacity of the environment.  This is estimated at 4.189 million tonnes, 
more than double the current level.  It is interesting to note that this is close to 
estimated stock size for 1946, the highest level observed in the data series 
(Appendix, Table A1). 
We will first consider cooperative management. 
 
5.1 Cooperative Management 
Optimal Effort 
We start out by analysing optimal effort.  Assuming identical prices and costs 
for the two players, cooperative management essentially implies sole owner 
optimisation.  This involves maximising the present value of eq. (2)  
Max 


T
t
tr1
1
tt
)1(
)cE - (ph
 
subject to stock dynamics represented by eq. (3).  Effort is allowed to vary from 
year to year, as part of an optimal policy.  The analysis will be based on a simulation 
model, with T = 20 years the length of the simulation period.  The discount rate is 
set at 10%. 
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We computed the dynamic optimum using the fmincon algorithm in Matlab. 
To reach the global optimum, the dynamic optimum was solved 1,000 times,  
starting from random initial guesses of the solution. 
For each starting value for stock size, two cases are considered, representing 
different cost parameters – one high cost of 2,500 and one low cost of 1,400.  In 
each case costs are the same for both players.  Results for the four cases – 
Cooperative Management (CM) 1-4 - are presented in Table 1. 
 Assuming the 2007 level as the starting value for the stock, the high cost case 
is seen to give rise to a Net Present Value (NPV) of 1,725 million NOK, while the low 
cost case gives a NPV of 3,368 million NOK.  A higher starting value for the stock will 
give rise to a higher NPV. As expected, cost per unit effort is a substantial 
determinant of NPV. 
 
Table 1.  Cooperative Management:  Solutions for Optimal Effort. 
Case Starting value stock 
size (million tonnes) 
Cost parameters NPV (million NOK) 
CM1 1.7 c1 = c2 = 2,500 1,725 
CM2 1.7 c1 = c2 = 1,400 3,368 
CM3 3.3 c1 = c2 = 2,500 2,228 
CM4 3.3 c1 = c2 = 1,400 4,312 
 
Figures 1 – 3 illustrate results for important variables for case CM1, showing 
optimal effort, harvest and stock size, respectively, over the 20 year period.  The 
most striking result is that an optimal policy calls for pulse fishing, with harvesting in 
years 4, 9, 14, 18 and 20, i.e., the stock is harvested in five out of 20 years, being 
closed in other years.  When the fishery is open, effort is about 0.8, except for year 
18, when it is 0.15. This result is due to the transient phase and should not be 
considered in the long run optimal management.  
The pulse fishing result is due to serial correlation in the growth function, with 
recruitment in one period depending on recruitment in previous years. This is the 
most important modification of our model compared to a standard bioeconomic 
model. In models that explicitly specify the age-structure of the population, pulse 
fishing is a common result. 
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Figure 1.  Optimal Effort as Fraction of the Stock Years 1-20.  Case CM1. 
 
As shown in figure 3, initial stock size is 1.7 million tonnes.  Stock size is then 
allowed to increase.  Pulse fishing occurs for the first time in year four with a harvest 
of about 3 million tonnes.  Harvest quantify is seen to be 3 – 3.5 mill tonnes in years 
4, 9, 14 and 20; 0.5 mill tonnes in year 18, otherwise zero.  Stock size varies 
between 1.5 – 4.2 mill tonnes. 
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Figure 2.  Optimal Catch Year 1-20.  Case CM1.  ‘000 Tonnes. 
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Figure 3.  Stock Size Years 1-20.  Case CM1.  ‘000 Tonnes. 
 
Figures 4-6 illustrate the low cost case (CM2).  This case also give rise to 
pulse fishing, however, as can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, fishing occurs at more 
frequent intervals than in the high cost case, with fishing taking place in seven out 
of 20 years.  This makes intuitive sense, as fishing is more profitable in the low cost 
case than in the high cost one. 
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Figure 4.  Fishing Effort per Year.  Case CM2. 
 
 It is interesting to compare stock development in the two cases.  In the high 
cost case, stock size varies between a low of about 1.5 million tonnes and a high of 
about 4 million tonnes (Figure 3).  In the low cost case, stock varies between about 
2 million tonnes and 3.2 – 3.4 million tonnes (Figure 6). The reason for this 
difference is that in the high cost case, a large increase in stock size is required in 
order to reduce unit cost of harvesting. 
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Figure 5.  Harvest Quantity per Year.  Case CM2. 
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Figure 6.  Stock Size per Year.  Case CM2.  ‘000 Tonnes. 
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Bjørndal and Brasao (2006), in an analysis of the Northeast Atlantic and 
Mediterranean bluefin tuna fishery, also found pulse fishing to be optimal.  In their 
case, five different gear types, with different levels of profitability, were considered.  
The “pulses” were found to be of different length for the different gear types, with 
the most profitable gear type being inactive for a shorter period of time than the 
least profitable gear type.  This provides an analogy to the high and low cost cases 
considered for cod. 
 
Constant Effort 
In the cases considered hitherto, effort is seen to vary substantially from year 
to year, from zero to very high levels.  This is not realistic because a policy of this 
nature might impose substantial social costs in years when the fishery is closed.   
There are also costs to fishing firms that are ignored by only considering variable 
costs. Most relevant in this regard is adjustment costs between active and inactive 
years, when vessel and equipment must be laid up and labour must be fired and 
hired – since this is by far their most important fishery.  From a market and 
marketing perspective, such a policy would also not be desirable. 
We now assume that effort is constant from year to year, a policy that is 
sometimes recommended in fisheries management.  This implies that a constant 
fraction of the stock is harvested every year.  Once more, a high cost and a low cost 
case are evaluated with results presented in Table 2, denoted CM 5-8. 
 In the high cost case, effort is maintained at a level of 0.14 every year, while 
in the low cost case it is 0.22.   Effort is divided evenly between the two players.  
Actual harvest will vary over time with changes in stock size. 
 For a starting value of 1.7 million tonnes for the stock, the high cost case 
gives rise to an NPV of 816 million NOK, less than half the NPV for the optimal case.  
The low cost case gives a NPV of 2,688 million NOK, compared to 3,368 million NOK 
(Table 1).  Thus, constant effort is seen to imply a loss in net present value.  
Moreover, the loss is greater for the high cost case than for the low cost case. 
 
 
Working Paper No. 26/10 
16 
 
 
Table 2.  Cooperative Management:  Solutions for Constant Effort. 
Case Starting value 
stock size (million 
tonnes) 
 Cost 
parameters 
Optimal 
effort (E) 
NPV (million 
NOK) 
Steady state 
stock size 
(‘000 tonnes) 
CM5 1.7 c1 = c2 =  
2,500 
0.14 816 3,692 
CM6 1.7 c1 = c2 =  
1,400 
0.22 2,688 3,177 
CM7 3.3 c1 = c2 =  
2,500 
0.18 1,569 3,460 
CM8 3.3 c1 = c2 =  
1,400 
0.26 3,848 2,843 
 
 The high cost and the low cost cases correspond to steady state stock sizes of 
3,692,000 and 3,177,000 tonnes, respectively.  As the carrying capacity of the 
environment was found to be close to 4.2 million tonnes, the high cost case involves 
a low degree of exploitation of the stock.  
 A higher starting value for the stock (cases CM7 and CM8) give rise to higher 
NPVs and steady state stock levels than the comparable cases with lower initial stock 
value. 
 Figures 7 and 8 illustrate catch and stock development, respectively, for the 
high cost case (CM5). Stock size starts out at 1.7 million tonnes and reaches the 
steady state after about 10 years with a concomitant increase in harvest. 
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Figure 7.  Catch per Year for Case CM5 (Constant E = 0.14).  ‘000 Tonnes. 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 26/10 
18 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
 
Figure 8.  Development in Stock Size over Time for Case CM5.  (E = 0.14).  ‘000 
Tonnes. 
 
 
5.2 Non-Cooperative Game 
Next, we will consider non-cooperative games.  This will be done for three 
alternatives with regard to cost parameters: 
1)  High costs:      c1 = c2 = 2,500 
2) Player 2 has cost advantage:  c1 = 2,500;  c2 = 1,400 
3) Low costs:    c1 = c2 = 1,400 
Cases 1) and 2) correspond to the high and low cost cases previously considered.  In 
case 2), however, player 2 has a cost advantage, having lower costs of effort then 
player 1.  As before, we will do the analysis for two starting values of the stock. 
The game is solved as a one-shot game where in the beginning of the game 
countries choose their fishing efforts that are employed for the rest of the game. 
The Nash equilibrium is solved iteratively by letting each country in its turn maximise 
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its NPV for a given effort of the other player. The equilibrium is found when optimal 
effort remains unchanged for the players. 
The results are summarised in Table 3, for two starting values of the stock, 
giving a total of six cases:  NC1 - 6.  For case NC1, where the players have equal 
costs, effort is 0.20, compared to 0.14 in the cooperative case, and stock size is 
reduced from 3.692 million tonnes to 3.325 million tonnes.  NPV is reduced from 816 
million NOK under cooperative management to 680 million NOK under non-
cooperation. 
Comparing the two low cost cases, NC3 and CM6, effort increases from 0.22 
to 0.30, stock size decreases from 3.177 million tonnes to 2.456 million tonnes, and 
NPV from 2,688 million tonnes to 2,266 million tonnes. 
Results for case NC2, where country 2 has a cost advantage, are interesting.  
Essentially this involves the fishery being dominated by country 2 with E2 = 0.21, 
with country 1 playing a minor part (E = 0.03) and almost all benefits accruing to 
country 2.  Steady state stock size is 3.015 million tonnes, comparable to the result 
for cooperative management (case CM6).  These results conform to the theoretical 
results derived by Clark (1980). 
For the other cases considered, results are qualitatively similar to those 
discussed here. As cost decreases, effort increases and steady state stock size 
decreases.  This is as expected.   
 
Table 3.  Comparison of Non-Cooperative Games.  NPV in Million NOK.  Stock Size in 
‘000 Tonnes. 
Case Initial stock  
size (million 
tonnes) 
c1  c2 Effort NPV1 NPV2 NPV1 +  
NPV2 
Stock  
Size 
NC1 1.7 2,500 2,500 0.20 340 340 680 3.325 
NC2 1.7 2,500 1,400 E1=0.03 
E2=0.21 
27 2.332 2,359 3.015 
NC3 1.7 1,400 1,400 0.30 1,133 1.133 2,266 2.456 
NC4 3.3 2,500 2,500 0.24 682 682 1,364 3,015 
NC5 3.3 2,500 1,400 E1=0.07 
E2=0.22 
198 2,855 3,053 2,556 
NC6 3.3 1,400 1,400 0.34 1,669 1,669 3,338 2,045 
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6. Summary and Discussion 
The current analysis has given some very interesting results.  Cooperative 
management of the resource is found to give rise to a very high net present value, 
although it depends on the cost parameters and the initial stock level.   
A striking result from the analysis is that an optimal policy calls for pulse 
fishing.  In the low cost case, fishing occurs at more frequent intervals than in the 
high cost case.  This makes intuitive sense, as fishing is more profitable in the low 
cost case than in the high cost one.  
The pulse fishing result is due to serial correlation in the growth function, with 
recruitment in one period depending on recruitment in previous years. In models 
that explicitly specify the age-structure of the population, pulse fishing is a common 
result. 
An optimal policy involves effort varying from year to year.  This is not 
realistic because a policy of this nature might impose substantial social costs when 
the fishery is closed.  For this reason, a constant effort policy is also considered, i.e., 
a policy where a constant fraction of the stock is harvested every year.   
 Constant effort is seen to imply a loss in net present value.  Moreover, the 
loss is greater for the high cost case than for the low cost case.  This, however, 
disregards possible social costs implied by effort varying from year to year. 
Non-cooperation is also analysed.  The game is solved as a one-shot game 
where in the beginning of the game countries choose their fishing efforts that are 
employed for the rest of the game.  Net present value is reduced compared to the 
case of cooperative management. 
In one case considered, country 2 has a cost advantage.  The outcome 
involves the fishery being dominated by country 2, with country 1 playing a minor 
part and almost all benefits accruing to country 2.   
In addition, the analysis has allowed us to identify some interesting topics for 
future research.  While constant and non-constant strategies were considered for 
the cooperative case, for non-cooperative games only constant strategies were 
analysed.  In the continuation of this research, non-constant strategies will be 
considered. 
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As discussed in the background section, overfishing has been an important 
aspect of the Northeast Atlantic cod fishery for many years.  Typically this is 
analysed through non-cooperative games.  Nevertheless, the fishery is characterised 
by cooperative management.  What then happens in the real world, is that one 
nation may break the cooperative agreement.  Often, it takes time for the other 
agent to detect this and respond.  In future research, we would like to include this 
kind of delayed response into non-cooperative games. 
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APPENDIX:  BIOLOGICAL DATA 
 
Table A1.  Annual Adult Stock Size, Landings and Recruitment 1946-2007.  Tonnes. 
  Stock Landings Recruitment 
1946 4,168,882 706,000 254,849
1947 3,692,801 882,017 136,099
1948 3,665,819 774,295 150,481
1949 3,065,111 800,122 173,289
1950 2,830,103 731,982 274,914
1951 3,141,009 827,180 433,501
1952 3,407,679 876,795 524,969
1953 3,557,376 695,546 636,151
1954 4,039,204 826,021 282,297
1955 3,488,383 1,147,841 87,289
1956 3,189,831 1,343,068 145,069
1957 2,495,895 792,557 265,578
1958 2,164,149 769,313 168,920
1959 2,415,826 744,607 239,291
1960 2,050,805 622,042 268,482
1961 2,137,149 783,221 284,221
1962 1,957,006 909,266 233,068
1963 1,747,579 776,337 151,061
1964 1,374,529 437,695 111,764
1965 1,440,693 444,930 295,238
1966 2,198,418 483,711 696,327
1967 2,852,164 572,605 375,671
1968 3,387,455 1,074,084 54,435
1969 2,805,591 1,197,226 49,297
1970 2,057,698 933,246 72,929
1971 1,610,969 689,048 182,148
1972 1,621,485 565,254 385,821
1973 2,401,955 792,685 691,201
1974 2,236,387 1,102,433 167,653
1975 2,037,430 829,377 254,863
1976 1,931,396 867,463 214,880
1977 1,950,748 905,301 170,547
1978 1,576,565 698,715 312,860
1979 1,114,381 440,538 69,471
1980 863,862 380,434 37,188
1981 983,658 399,038 73,926
1982 750,871 363,730 56,177
1983 738,675 289,992 61,727
1984 817,596 277,651 167,089
1985 957,513 307,920 216,277
1986 1,294,448 430,113 323,074
1987 1,126,275 523,071 60,419
1988 915,458 434,939 43,385
1989 890,359 332,481 51,662
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1990 962,672 212,000 96,614
1991 1,561,711 319,158 213,302
1992 1,912,190 513,234 317,280
1993 2,359,674 581,611 307,844
1994 2,155,298 771,086 190,449
1995 1,825,929 739,999 132,065
1996 1,686,862 732,228 85,405
1997 1,532,187 762,403 144,619
1998 1,230,183 592,624 183,376
1999 1,101,326 484,910 111,306
2000 1,101,505 414,868 117,611
2001 1,375,566 426,471 147,741
2002 1,542,075 535,045 110,714
2003 1,608,810 551,990 155,977
2004 1,565,794 606,445 74,315
2005 1,555,835 641,276 135,219
2006 1,496,200 537,642 128,094
2007 1,700,760 486,883 203,699
Source:  http://www.ices.dk/workinggroups/ViewWorkingGroup.aspx?ID=28 
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Table A2.  Northeast Atlantic cod. Nominal catch (t) by countries (ICES Sub-areas I 
and Divisions IIa and IIb combined.) 
Year Faroe 
Islan
ds 
Fran
ce 
Greenla
nd 
Germa
ny 
Norwa
y 
Spain United 
Kingdo
m 
Russia Icela
nd 
Othe
rs 
Total 
199
5 
22,26
2 
4,91
2 
7,462 7,428 319,9
87
15,5
05
16,329 296,1
58
34,21
4 
15,7
42 
739,9
99
199
6 
17,75
8 
5,35
2 
6,529 8,326 319,1
58
15,8
71
16,061 305,3
17
23,00
5 
14,8
51 
732,2
28
199
7 
20,07
6 
5,35
3 
6,426 6,680 357,8
25
17,1
30
18,066 313,3
44
4,200 13,3
03 
762,4
03
199
8 
14,29
0 
1,19
7 
6,388 3,841 284,6
47
14,2
12
14,294 244,1
15
1,423 8,21
7 
592,6
24
199
9 
13,70
0 
2,13
7 
4,093 3,019 223,3
90
8,99
4
11,315 210,3
79
1,985 5,89
8 
484,9
10
200
0 
13,35
0 
2,62
1 
5,787 3,513 192,8
60
8,69
5
9,165 166,2
02
7,562 5,11
5 
414,8
70
200
1 
12,50
0 
2,68
1 
5,727 4,524 188,4
31
9,19
6
8,698 183,5
72
5,917 5,22
5 
426,4
71
200
2 
15,69
3 
2,93
4 
6,419 4,517 202,5
59
8,41
4
8,977 184,0
72
5,975 5,48
4 
445,0
45
200
3 
19,42
7 
2,92
1 
7,026 4,732 191,9
77
7,92
4
8,711 182,1
60
5,963 6,14
9 
436,9
90
200
4 
19,22
6 
3,62
1 
8,196 6,187 212,1
17
11,2
85
14,004 201,5
25
7,201 6,08
2 
489,4
45
200
5 
16,27
3 
3,49
1 
8,135 5,848 207,8
25
9,34
9
10,744 200,0
77
5,874 7,66
0 
475,2
76
200
6a 
16,48
0 
3,83
4 
8,164 3,769 201,1
85
9,21
9
10,594 203,7
75
5,915 6,26
1 
469,1
97
aProvisional figures. 
Source:  ICES AFWG Report 2007. 
 
